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 A novel, hybrid input–output analysis of historic feed-in tariff impacts.
 We explore operational, investment, and opportunity cost/benefits in Portugal.
 Environmental (GHG), economic (GDP), and social (job years) impacts are estimated.
 For 2000–2010 we find impacts of 7.2 MtCO2eq GHG, +1557 M€ GDP and +160,000 job years.
 Lifetime impacts are dependent on opportunity costs of future FIT payments.a r t i c l e i n f o
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Over the past two decades, many countries have used aggressive policies such as feed-in tariffs and
power purchase agreements to promote renewable energy. These policies have been very successful in
several countries, initiating large changes in the structure of energy sectors, and conferring large environ-
mental, economic, and social impacts. In this paper, we quantify these impacts over the period
2000–2010 for Portugal; a country that witnessed a substantial increase in renewable energy penetration
rates, with the share of wind power in electricity production jumping from 0.4% in 2000 to 16.8% in 2010.
We use a novel, hybrid energy-economic input–output model to compare the historical energy policy
against a counterfactual scenario in which the surge in energy subsidies and concurrent expansion of
renewable energies did not take place. We consider the impact of renewable energy policy stemming
from three propagation modes – operational, investment, and opportunity costs – in both the energy
sector and the rest of the economy. This is the first time such a comprehensive analysis has been under-
taken. Our findings show that, in the period under consideration, the combined historical renewable
energy policy and renewable energy developments yielded a clear reduction in emissions, in excess of
7.2 MtCO2eq, an increase in GDP of 1557 M€, and a creation of 160 thousand job-years. These estimates
do not include opportunity costs from future FIT payments that projects built in this period may be
entitled to. Therefore, this work will be of critical interest to RES-E and climate change policy makers,
other scientists, and the public.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Energy produced from renewable sources (RES-E) is becoming a
significant fraction of the electricity supply mix in many countries
[1]. This expansion has been driven mainly by commitments to
national and international targets towards the reduction of green-
house gas emissions [2], although subsidiary goals such as supplydiversification and energy independence also play a role [3]. The
rapid expansion of renewable energy has been driven by the imple-
mentation of various policy mechanisms [4–7], of which the most
prominent are feed-in tariffs (FITs) [8]. In a FIT scheme, a fixed
amount of money per unit of renewable electricity is paid to the
renewable energy producer, irrespective of market value. The tariff
acts as an incentive in compensating for the higher costs of RES-E
compared to conventional energy production and its value takes
into account the source, environmental aspects, and the inflation
310 P. Behrens et al. / Applied Energy 173 (2016) 309–319rate. Tariffs are generally fixed for a long period (typically 15 years
to offer long term stability to electricity producers).
Given that FITs are the most prominent policy mechanism for
the expansion of RES-E, it is vital that their broad impacts are
understood. Herein we split these impacts by environmental,
economic, and social indicators; GHG (GreenHouse Gases), GDP
(Gross Domestic Product), and JY (Job Years, respectively. The con-
tribution of FIT policies for the reduction of GHGs is generally
unambiguous [9–12] but there is research to suggest that some
level of infrastructure would be built anyway [13] and that, for
some types of generation, the timing of the policy influences the
sustainability of developments [14]. The impact of FIT policies on
GDP are likely to be large [15], but are not yet as clear as those
for GHGs, and vary by the type of analytical approaches used. In
a Greek study that combined historical data and a forecast scenario
for 2010–2020, Markaki et al. [16] suggested that the capital
investment on renewable energy technology has positive impacts
on GDP, however operational and opportunity costs/benefits were
not explored. Antonelli and Desideri [17] investigated the relation-
ship between FITs and PV cost in Italy, finding that the costs of PV
plants are not driven by the amount of installed power but by the
tariffs, implying a market distortion which may mean higher
opportunity costs. In Wand and Leuthold [18], the potential effects
of Germany’s FIT policies on roof-top PV between 2009–2030 were
explored using a partial equilibrium model in which broad net
social costs/benefits were found from 2014 to +7586 M€. By
including a merit-order effect, Gallego-Castillo and Victoria [19]
found that there are FIT policy settings which give no opportunity
cost (for wind power and PV only). Finally, in terms of employment
impacts, Lehr et al. [20] studied the impact of the German renew-
able energy policy on employment using an econometric input–
output (IO) model and found that, in the most plausible scenario,
the effect is positive. Markaki et al. [16] found that the capital
investment on renewable energy technology also has positive
impacts on job creation. In the Portuguese case, Oliveira et al.
[21] suggested that official goals for RES-E job creation are over-
estimated. Additionally, several computable general equilibrium
(CGE) studies have concluded that current renewable energy policy
has a net positive effect in job creation [22,23]. Conversely, in the
case of Canada and using a CGE model, Böhringer et al. [24]
concluded that policies designed to promote renewable energy
have negative impacts on employment. Negative impacts on job
creation have been also found by Alvarez et al. [25], whose
methodology has in turn been contested by Lantz and Tegen
[26]. Lambert and Silva [9] presents additional references on the
nexus of employment and renewable energy policy, and concludes
that the result of the analysis depends crucially on the spatial scale
considered.
We are interested not only in examining the impacts of renew-
able energy policy within the energy sector itself, but also its impli-
cations for the wider economy, through three propagation modes:
operational, capital, and opportunity costs/benefits. The opera-
tional mode is usually considered in IO studies, and manifests
through purchase of the intermediate inputs from the rest of the
economy that are necessary for energy production. As renewable
energy production requires extensive infrastructure, we also look
at the capital formation mode [27]. Finally, because by nature FITs
are financial incentives, we also examine the opportunity mode of
propagation, which are costs incurred by energy consumers and
taxpayers.
To the best of our knowledge, the current literature on quanti-
tative FIT policy impacts is forward looking, using a model cali-
brated in a reference year and examining the impact of future
development scenarios. We are unaware of studies that retrospec-
tively look at the broad impact of historical renewable energy pol-
icy. Additionally, prior studies referenced above have focused onone facet of FIT impacts, such as a single propagation mode (capital
costs/benefits) or a single RES-E technology (PV). In this study, we
offer a contribution to close this knowledge gap in three main
ways: firstly, by analysing historic data, we suggest that the
impacts computed herein represent an increase in robustness for
the impacts of a FIT policy to date; secondly, since we account
for impacts in all three modes of propagation, we provide net
impacts of a FIT policy, not just one part of the picture; finally,
we present a transparent methodological framework for future
backward-looking studies which will help reduce the uncertainty
in impacts and aid the development of future FIT policy. Therefore,
this work will be of critical interest to RES-E and climate change
policy makers, other scientists, and the public.
Portugal witnessed a substantial increase in the penetration
rate of RES-E from 30% to 54% in the period under analysis, in par-
allel with the adoption of generous FITs and other subsidies
[28,29], and is thus a prime candidate for this study. Note that
although we are focused on a particular country, our results have
wider, international, implications for the design and implementa-
tion of FITs [13] since, as Couture and Gagnon [8] notes, among
the most successful implementations (Germany, Spain, Portugal,
and Denmark), the payment levels are operated in very similar
ways [30,31], i.e. as close as possible in relation to specific genera-
tion costs [32,33]. As such, the in-depth study here is internation-
ally applicable to other nations.
The approach we follow to address the research question is to
build and analyse an energy-economic hybrid input–output (IO)
model [34]. There is a long tradition dating back to the oil crisis
[35–37] in this type of analysis, rejuvenated in more recent years
by the interest in climate change studies [38–41]. We combine a
disaggregated foreground energy sector compiled from multiple
sources in an existing model of the national economy [42–44].
We use historical data, calibrating the energy and economic model
in every year, comparing the empirical observations against a
counterfactual scenario in which the set of incentives that lead to
the observed surge in renewable energy penetration did not take
place.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the Por-
tuguese renewable energy policy in 2000–2010; Section 3
describes the approach and methods and Section 4 describes data
sources and processing assumptions; Section 5 presents the
results; Section 6 presents the discussion; and to conclude Sec-
tion 7 offers final remarks.2. Empirical background
This section presents an overview of the most notable features
of renewable energy policy and the evolution of the electricity sec-
tor in Portugal in the period 2000–2010. The numbers and figures
reported are taken directly from the mentioned references.
The share of electricity produced from renewable sources in
Portugal reached more than 50% in 2010, from 30% in 2000 [45].
As illustrated in Fig. 1, this evolution was driven by a steady
increase in the share of wind power and other renewable energy
sources, with large hydro exhibiting year-on-year fluctuations
resulting from variations in rainfall. During this period total elec-
tricity output increased from 44 to 54 GW h per year.
As shown in Fig. 2, the installed power capacity of nonrenew-
able electricity sources remained stable during this period, except
for natural gas, whose installed capacity reached that of the leader,
large hydro. By contrast, the installed capacity of all renewables
increased during this period. The installed capacity remained small
for all RES-E except wind power and large hydro (below 600 MW),
led by combined heat and power (CHP) biomass and small hydro.
Wind power, however, exhibited an explosive increase, reaching
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Fig. 1. Evolution of the share of different renewable energy sources for electricity production (RES-E) in Portugal.
P. Behrens et al. / Applied Energy 173 (2016) 309–319 311an installed power capacity in the vicinity of 4 GW by 2010, on par
with natural gas and large hydro (5.2 GW).
The main policy instrument used in Portugal to promote elec-
tricity from renewable sources are feed-in tariffs or FITs [28].
Under the Portuguese energy policy, FITs were offered to renew-
able sources (except large hydro) as well as micro distributed gen-
eration (e.g. solar PV, wind), waste and co-generation, and CHP
generation from renewable and non-renewable sources. Special
incentives and guaranteed purchase prices have been granted to
CHP and waste since 1988 [28]. There are also subsidies to electric-
ity production from conventional non-renewable thermal sources
(mainly oil, coal and natural gas), Power Purchase Agreements or
PPAs, designed to guarantee a pre-established return on invest-
ment over the economic lifetime of the plant [28]. Their goal is0
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Fig. 2. Evolution of the installed, nameplate powerto guarantee enough installed capacity of a backup technology that
can compensate the natural variability of renewable sources.
Fig. 3 shows the historical evolution of these financial incen-
tives, based on data from Amorim et al. [28]. The highest FIT is
for photovoltaic, which started at over 500 €/MW h in 2003, and
later decreased to 300 €/MW h. Most of the other FITs have steadily
increased and stabilized at between 80 and 120 €/MW h.
The combined rise in installed capacity and energy subsidies
contributed to a rise in energy costs. The average price of low volt-
age electricity (usually 230 V) rose from 110 to 150 €/MW h, of
medium voltage (10 kV to 30 kV) from 65 to 95 €/MW h and the
high and very high voltage (60 kV or higher) from 45 to 60 €/
MW h [46]. Hence, prices rose approximately by 50% over this per-
iod. The energy bill can be decomposed in several componentsLarge Hydro
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Fig. 3. Evolution of financial incentives (FITs and PPA). MSW stands for municipal solid waste. Secondary axis (right) is only for solar technology.
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costs. The fraction of the energy bill that is used to finance the FITs
is close to 8% for low voltage brackets and for the PPAs varies from
4% to 8% [47].
Still, the observed increase in energy costs for consumers was
not enough to compensate the rise in energy production costs dur-
ing this period, which resulted from the expansion of subsidies and
from increasing fossil fuel prices [48]. The gap between energy
costs and the electricity bill was footed by the government, which
accumulated what is known as energy tariff deficit [28] to be paid
with interest over a period of more than a decade. In the period
under analysis, the gap between total costs and consumer bill
changed from 1568 M€2002 in 2000 to 2125 M€2002 in 2010, a figure
which includes debt incurred to finance both FITs and PPAs among
other items [49].3. Methods
In Section 2 we observed that during the period under analysis
there were substantial shifts in the share of sources in total elec-
tricity output and installed capacity, as well as in the financial
incentives that support them. Our goal in this paper is to quantify
the environmental and socio-economic impacts of those changes.
The variables we will examine are the impacts on GreenHouse
Gas emissions (or GHG, measured in MtCO2eq), Gross Domestic
Product (or GDP, measured in M€) and Job Years (or JY, measured
in thousand years, ky).
We quantify those impacts both in the energy sector itself and
in the rest of the economy. The energy sector is the set of different
technologies for production (coal, gas, wind, hydro, etc.), transmis-
sion and distribution of electricity and fossil fuels. The rest of the
economy are agriculture, manufacture and services, further subdi-
vided into other subsectors.
We will distinguish direct and indirect impacts. Direct impacts
can only occur in the energy sector itself and are those directly
associated with renewable energy policy, for example if a worker
is hired in the wind power sector, or if GHG emissions drop
because a gas power station is turned off, as a consequence of
the FITs. Indirect impacts can occur both in the energy sector andin the rest of the economy are those impacts which propagate
along the supply chain of goods and services, for example an
increase in value added generation in the steel industry due to
increased demand to supply the construction of a new wind farm.
Total (direct and indirect) impacts of a demand stimulus Dy on
some environmental or socio-economic intervention (e.g., GHG
emission, GDP, or employment) Dr are calculated using the Leon-
tief model [50], which reads:
Dr ¼ b0 I Að Þ1Dy; ð1Þ
where bold denotes a matrix object, uppercase denotes a matrix
and lowercase denotes a vector. In the remainder of this paper vec-
tors are in column format by default, 0 denotes transpose and italic
denotes a scalar.
Object b is the vector of intervention coefficients and ðI AÞ1 is
the Leontief inverse or total requirement matrix. A is the matrix of
technical coefficients and Aij expresses the purchases of i that are
required to generate one unit of output of j. Direct coefficient bi
expresses the amount of intervention that occurs per unit of total
output of industry i. Total requirement Lij expresses the total out-
put of industry i that is stimulated by a unit demand for product j.
In the conventional Leontief model Dy, the change in final
demand is the (exogenous) control variable, A and b are parame-
ters and Dr is the (endogenous) return variable. According to the
System of National Accounts [42], final demand is broken down
into consumption by institutional sectors, mainly households and
government, fixed capital formation and exports, besides smaller
components. Households are families and individuals, and their
component of final demand is what is commonly understood as
private consumption. Fixed capital formation or investment is
the accumulation of durable goods such as buildings, machines
or transport equipment (also including intangibles such as com-
puter software).
In this paper however, we are not interested in calculating the
impact of a final demand stimulus but rather the impact of a his-
torically observed renewable energy policy. We do so by contrast-
ing the reference scenario (the observed evolution of energy
consumption) against an alternative scenario which describes a
P. Behrens et al. / Applied Energy 173 (2016) 309–319 313counterfactual evolution of the renewable energy sector. We make
the following assumptions:
 In the alternative scenario the observed expansion in the share
of renewable energy in electricity production does not take
place, being replaced by natural gas.
 In the alternative scenario the observed expansion in the
installed capacity of renewable energy infrastructure does not
take place.
 In the alternative scenario no financial incentives to support
renewable energy are passed on to consumers and taxpayers.
 Final demand in the economy for energy services and for com-
modities from the rest of economy is the same in both
scenarios.
The counterfactual energy policy against which we compare has
the same observed changes in the final demand for energy services
as over the 2000–2010 period. This implies that in the counterfac-
tual, the energy needs of the country were still met, but that they
were met with non-renewable generation. We make the assump-
tion that these needs were met by increasing the load factor of nat-
ural gas generation in the system. This assumption is plausible as
natural gas is already the backstop technology for shortages, and
because it is the least intensive energy source in the energy portfo-
lio (which does not contemplate nuclear and has commitments
under Kyoto). It is important to note that the counterfactual does
not take into account increases in RES-E that would have occurred
in the absence of FIT policy. As such the estimates here should be
thought of as a maximum-cost estimate of the impacts of com-
bined policy and autonomous RES-E developments, as further dis-
cussed in Section 6.
Formally, we model the net impact of renewable energy policy
as the sum of the impacts across three separate modes of propaga-
tion, operational costs, capital formation and opportunity costs:
DrT ¼ DrO þ DrK þ DrS; ð2Þ
where Dr is the difference in environmental, economic, or employ-
ment impacts between the reference and counterfactual scenarios
for a particular dimension of interest (GHG, GDP, or JY). Subscript
T refers to total impacts. Subscripts O;K and S refer impacts in the
operational, capital and opportunity modes of propagation,
respectively.
Operational costs are the expenditure of firms for the purchase
of goods and services necessary for production (of electricity, in
this case). Within this mode of propagation we therefore subsume
the direct impacts occurring in the energy sector due to energy
production and the indirect impacts in the rest of the economy
due to purchases related to energy production.
We use the theoretical framework developed by Rodrigues et al.
[51] for waste management policies to model the operational mode
of propagation here. In contrast to the conventional Leontief model
we consider final demand, y, as a parameter that is fixed (i.e., com-
mon for both the reference and counterfactual scenarios) and
instead treat the technical coefficients as control variables.Weapply
the Leontief model using two different technical coefficient matri-
ces: the empirically observed one, A, and a hypothetical counterfac-
tual, AAlt. Operational impacts, DrO, are calculated using Eq. (3):
DrO ¼ b0 I Að Þ1  I AAlt
 1 
y: ð3Þ
The counterfactual technical coefficient matrix, AAlt, describes
the direct requirements that would occur if the observed renew-
able energy policy had not been implemented. The alternative
technology matrix is identical to the reference technology, A,except that all RES-E production is capped at the 2000 level, with
the difference to the observed electricity production being sup-
ported by natural gas, as described above.
Capital formation or investment costs are incurred when there
is an expansion in infrastructure (of electricity production, in this
case). The expansion of the electric grid and construction of power
generation facilities therefore led to indirect effects, for example
employment in the construction sector during the installation of
wind turbines.
Capital impacts, DrK , are calculated using Eq. (1), with the stim-
ulus vector, Dy, being the observed capital formation that can be
attributed to RES-E infrastructure, e.g., the expenditure for pur-
chasing and assembling wind turbines, establishing grid connec-
tions or other RES-E development.
Capital impacts are allocated to the year in which capital forma-
tion occurs using empirically available information, so there is no
need to amortise costs or normalise the effect of inflation.
Opportunity costs emerge because FITs represent a net subsidy
to electricity producers which is incurred by energy users and tax
payers. Hence, in the counterfactual scenario, by not subsidising
FITs, the budget of households and firms would expand and there
would be an expansion of their expenditure, leading to indirect
impacts. For example, if households had a smaller electricity bill
they would have more money available to travel more.
Opportunity impacts, DrS, are also calculated using Eq. (1), but
now the stimulus vector is the reduced consumption due to FIT
payments. We assume that the consumption profile (i.e., the share
of expenditure in a particular item) is identical in both the refer-
ence and alternative scenarios, but this profile changes from year
to year according to the empirical observations. Notice that the
costs of subsidising the FIT are shared among all electricity con-
sumers, including both households and firms.
A complicating factor in the accounting of opportunity impacts
is the existence of the tariff deficit, described at the end of Sec-
tion 2. Since this tariff deficit will run into the period beyond
2010, 2011 onwards is in the future from the perspective of our
scenario generation. We addressed this problem by separately
accounting for the opportunity costs that accrue from 2011
onwards due to payment amortisation and interest payments.
We assume that the tariff deficit is repaid like a loan, i.e. repaid
in equal, annual instalments over a set period, and with a set inter-
est rate. The opportunity cost in each year is the sum of the present
value of the deficit loan and the amount that was actually repaid in
that year. We calculate the net present value using Eq. (4).
Vp ¼ rND
1 ð1 rÞN ð4Þ
where Vp is the present value of a deficit D, paid in equal annual
instalments, amortised overN years and at an interest rate of r. How-
ever, since the tariff deficit repayments will be made in an unknown
future (from 2011 onwards), we are unable to directly model the
opportunity costs of the repayments under unknown economy
assumptions. To gain an understanding of the uncertainty, we keep
the total future amortization and interest payments fixed but use dif-
ferent technology bundles. For example, for the opportunity impacts
in 2005, we take the full amortized repayments and interest for 2005
and calculate the impacts usingEq. (1) for the technology assumption
in each year through the period 2000 to 2010. This results in 10 dif-
ferent estimates of opportunity impacts. The maximum and mini-
mum impacts are then the error bounds on the estimate.4. Data and assumptions
The reference technical and intervention coefficients A and b
were calibrated from source flow data as:
314 P. Behrens et al. / Applied Energy 173 (2016) 309–319A ¼ ZdiagðxÞ1;
b0 ¼ r0 diagðxÞ1;
where diag represents diagonal matrix, and the flow data satisfies
the accounting identity:
Ziþ Yi ¼ x; ð5Þ
where i is a vector of ones, Z is the matrix of inter-industry flows, Y
is the matrix of final demand flows and x is total output.
As mentioned in Section 3, we are interested in identifying
impacts in both the energy sector itself and the rest of the econ-
omy. We therefore elaborate the energy-economic hybrid
described in Guevara and Rodrigues [52], which reports time-
series data from 1995 to 2010. The model of Guevara and Rodri-
gues [52] has three main components:
 The use of primary energy carriers within the energy sector and
their transformation into final energy carriers to be used by the
rest of the economy, in energy units. The energy sector is char-
acterised by 18 energy technologies (wind, gas, hydro, etc.,
including transmission and distribution) and 42 energy carriers.
The main data source are the annual national energy budget
provided by DGEG (Directorate General-Energy and Geology,
http://www.dgeg.pt).
 The use of final energy carriers by the rest of the economy
(intermediate and final consumers), in energy units. The main
data source for this is the use of carriers by different economic
sectors, provided by INE, (National Statistics Institute, National
Accounts, http://www.ine.pt). The alignment between energy
and economic data involved aggregation as well as disaggrega-
tion, in accordance with the official classification of economic
activities [53].
 The use of products by industries to generate new products and
their use by final consumers, in monetary units. The rest of the
economy (i.e., outside the energy sector) is described by 49
industries and 49 product categories based on the NACE 2-
digit classification, and all monetary data reported in constant2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2
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monised supply and use tables provided by Eurostat (http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat).
For the goals of the present study additional information had to
be collected, as described below. For consistency, all additional
monetary data was deflated to constant prices of 2002 too. Note
that different data components might have been reported in
different classifications and had therefore to be aggregated or dis-
aggregated to match the model described above. The time frame of
analysis, 2000–2010, was chosen as a compromise between data
availability and the existence of a clearly observable energy transi-
tion, illustrated in Section 2.
Information about GHG emissions (CO2, CH4 and N2O) in the
rest of the economy were obtained from Eurostat, with the global
warming potential conversion factors to CO2-equivalent obtained
from Forster et al. [54]. Concerning the energy sector proper we
gathered the following information: installed capacity power,
investment and operational costs, GHG emissions, employment,
financial incentives and decomposition of the energy bill.
The installed power capacity was gathered from information
presented in DGEG [55], INEGI [56], Ferreira et al. [57] and Holm
et al. [58]. Operational, maintenance and investment costs of dif-
ferent energy technologies were obtained from EU [59], Kaplan
[60], EIA [61], NREL [62] and IEA [63]. GHG emission factors were
obtained from the IPCC 2006 Guidelines [64] and the global warm-
ing potentials from Forster et al. [54]. Employment data was
obtained from Rutovitz and Harris [65]. Data on subsidies to elec-
tricity producers data were obtained from Amorim et al. [28] and
the discrimination of financing by households and activities was
performed using data from ERSE [47]. The use of products from
the rest of the economy by different energy technologies was char-
acterised with data provided by Oliveira et al. [21].
The breakdown of investment costs within each energy technol-
ogy was collected from multiple sources: Krohn et al. [66] for wind
energy technology; IRENA [67] and IEA [68] for hydro power005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
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ounterfactual split by operational, capital, and opportunity modes of propagation.
P. Behrens et al. / Applied Energy 173 (2016) 309–319 315plants; IEA [69] and Henneberger [70] for geothermal power
plants; and NREL [62] for the remainder technologies. These
process-based production recipes were then matched with the
total capital formation of the electricity sector reported in table
C.3 of the national accounts, also provided by the INE website.
The impact of the tariff deficit was calculated using an average
maturity of 15 years and an interest rate of 3% [49, p. 44]. The tariff
deficit in every year was calculated as the difference between pro-
duction costs and the consumer bill.
These data types are available for many nations, in some cases,
the same or similar sources can be used to collect data on other
European nations for further in-depth analyses of this type in other
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Fig. 6. Capital formation impacts for energy and eco5. Results
This section presents the main results of our analysis, based on
the methods described in Section 3, and using the data described in
Section 4. The numbers and figures reported are an elaboration of
the resulting calculations.
Fig. 4 summarises the impact of renewable energy policy in Por-
tugal on GHG emissions, GDP, and job creation in the period 2000–
2010 through three propagation modes (operational, capital, and
opportunity).
Initially, all types of impacts were small, reflecting the pick-up
in the spread of FITs and RES-E. In time, these impacts rose in mag-
nitude and patterns diverged. In the period under analysis net GHG2007 2008 2009 2010
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316 P. Behrens et al. / Applied Energy 173 (2016) 309–319emissions exhibited a steady and significant decline, dropping to
net yearly savings of 2.4 MtCO2eq. Impacts of the capital mode of
propagation are all positive, as these are the impacts associated
with the installation of RES-E infrastructure and formation of cap-
ital. Cumulative, net GHG impacts, calculated by summing over the
10 year period of analysis, show a mitigation of 7.2 MtCO2eq. By
contrast GDP oscillated, reaching a maximum creation of 577 M€
in 2007, and a reduction of 495 M€ in 2010. JY also oscillated,
but remained positive for most of the period, resulting in a maxi-
mum of 42 ky in 2008 and a reduction of 2 ky in 2005. Cumulative,
net impacts for GDP equate to a creation of 1557 M€ and for
employment, a creation of 160 ky.
The evolution of the three modes of propagation differed signif-
icantly: operational costs have a major role in GHG savings, but
minor in GDP and employment; capital formation had a significant
and strictly positive impact (i.e., increase) across all propagation
modes; by contrast, opportunity costs had a strictly negative
impact (i.e., savings) across all propagation modes. Overall, oppor-
tunity costs became key determinants of global GDP and employ-
ment impacts by the end of the period under analysis.
Two key shifts in the capital impacts can be seen, once in 2003,
and again in 2008. The shift in 2003 reflects the construction of a
large municipal solid waste plant and a peak year in wind develop-
ment in the early part of the decade. The shift in 2008 is dominated
by the peak development of wind and photovoltaics during the
decade. The subsequent reduction in the expansion of the RES-E
infrastructure after 2008 can be explained by the global recession
and national financial crisis, which led to a sharp increase in the
cost of capital and a general climate of uncertainty that discour-
aged investment.
It is interesting to put these figures in perspective, by examining
the impacts as a percentage of the total energy sector and total
national values. In the final year of analysis, 2010, mitigated emis-
sions comprised 19% of the total GHG emissions of the energy sec-
tor and 4% of total national emissions; GDP showed a 8.3% decrease
within the energy sector, and a reduction of 0.3% of the whole
economy; and job creation showed an increase of 6% in the energy
sector and 0.04% increase in the national labour market.2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
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Fig. 7. Opportunity impacts for energy and econoDisaggregating these impacts into the sectors in which they
occur gives further insight into how the structure of the economy
changes in response to RES-E incentives. In particular, we want to
distinguish whether they occur within the energy sector itself or in
other economic activities. Fig. 5 splits the overall impacts for the
operational mode of propagation into energy technologies and
aggregated economic sectors.
For both GHG emissions and GDP creation, the majority of
impacts are felt within the energy sector itself, with residual, small
impacts in the rest of the economy. We see the largest reduction in
GHG emissions within the energy sector itself, as may be expected.
This is as a result of the emissions avoided in just one sector, nat-
ural gas, since it was assumed that this would have replaced the
RES-E in the counterfactual scenario. The reduction of GDP due
to the operational factors is related almost entirely to the reduction
of the natural gas sector, and while some of this is counterbalanced
by the wind sector, there is a net reduction of 200 M€ by 2010.
The impact of the operational mode of propagation on employ-
ment, while small, has repercussions both inside and outside the
energy sector. The largest positive impact on JY include construc-
tion, wind, and financial services. Notice that the operational and
maintenance costs (as opposed to capital formation) persist for
as long as an equipment is in use and that energy infrastructure
has a life expectancy of several decades. This implies that while
these impacts are small they would be expected to continue past
the time frame of this study, as they are related to the structural
evolution of the energy sector.
Fig. 6 splits the capitalmode of propagation in the sameway. The
capital mode of propagation can be thought of as the impacts asso-
ciated with infrastructure, so will necessarily be positive in all
impacts (in the mathematical sense, not in the sense of being bene-
ficial) as in the counterfactual there was sufficient natural gas
capacity so that no further infrastructure development was neces-
sary. The construction and industry & trade sectors see the largest
sector impacts. Industry & trade comprises the largest growth in
GHG emissions, with construction the second largest. Some smaller
changes in emissions are seen in coal and natural gas, which are
related to the fabrication of the renewable energy units. For impacts2007 2008 2009 2010
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P. Behrens et al. / Applied Energy 173 (2016) 309–319 317in employment, these are reversed, with construction providing the
largest increase in employment. This is perhaps unsurprising given
the labour intensive nature of infrastructure development. Finally,
the increased GDP associated with these capital investments are
split equally between industry & trade and construction.
Finally, Fig. 7 shows the sector impacts of the opportunity mode
of propagation. As the deficit was built in the payments of the FITs
as described in Section 2, these future repayments were included
in the 2000–2010 timeframe. As the opportunity costs are a reflec-
tion of consumer patterns as described in Section 3, the GHG
reductions are twice as large in the rest of the economy than the
energy sector. The energy impacts are seen largely in natural gas
as the opportunity cost of the FITs would suppress consumption
of electricity (which was assumed to be back-filled with natural
gas). The largest sector across all impacts is industry & trade as
might be expected with a reduction in consumption. It is important
to highlight that although levels of FIT vary with time (see Fig. 3)
the payments are usually guaranteed for 15 years.6. Discussion
This study characterised the economy-wide impacts of RES-E
and FIT policy, by comparing historical data against a counterfac-
tual under which renewable energy development would not have
occurred. We assume that the observed RES-E developments
would have not been economical or built without the FIT. Since
there may have been some percentage of RES-E infrastructure that
might have been built regardless of the presence of a FIT (for exam-
ple wind production at the best sites), the estimates presented here
imply a ‘maximum cost’ estimate. While we are unable to estimate
the proportion of RES-E that would have been built anyway, it is
important to note that the role of FITs as a key driver of RES-E
infrastructure is generally uncontroversial [8,17,12]. These esti-
mates were further split by mode of propagation: capital formation
(building new infrastructure), operational (running the equip-
ment) and opportunity (the loss of income incurred to subsidise
the FITs).
An important caveat to our results is that the longevity of
impacts will be dependent on the mode of propagation. While
we find cumulative net impacts of a GHG reduction of 7.2 MtCO2-
eq, a creation of 1557 M€ in GDP, and a creation of 160 ky in JY, we
expect operational impacts to continue for the lifetime of the
infrastructure (generally considered to be 25 years, but which in
practice may be even longer). Conversely, the impacts of capital
formation are short-lived because only minor additional invest-
ment is necessary during the lifetime of the infrastructure. The sit-
uation with opportunity costs is intermediate, since producers are
entitled to continuing FIT subsidies for a period of 15 years, with-
out guarantee of additional subsidies thereafter.
We can use these estimates of the various time frames to har-
monise the impacts resulting from the different modes of propaga-
tion, to provide a lifetime estimate for the total impact of the FIT
policy in the period 2000–2010, including the propagation of
opportunity costs into the future. The operational component
was modelled by assuming that the impacts of the most recent
year propagate for a period of 25 years. Impacts from investment
were assumed to be confined to the 2000–2010 decade. Finally,
opportunity costs were assumed to continue at the 2010 level for
3 years and then to wind down to zero during the following dec-
ade. In keeping with a ‘maximum cost’ philosophy, we assume
no discount rate in the opportunity cost.
Combining this information we find a total mitigation of
71 MtCO2eq resulting from the energy policy implemented in the
period 2000–2010. This implies that the fraction of emissions mit-
igation that result from the policy and actually occur during thetime frame 2000–2010 was just 10%, with the remainder occurring
after 2010. Similar figures for GDP are a total reduction of 13 thou-
sand M€, implying that only 11% of the impacts occur within the
original time frame. Finally, for job creation the total impacts of
the policy are a reduction of 128 ky, meaning that 56% of the
impacts occur within the original time frame. Thus, we see that
for GHG emissions and GDP creation, impacts extend deep into
the future while roughly half of the effects on employment occur
within the period of implementation of the policy. These figures
are back-of-the-envelope calculations intended to provide an
insight about the importance of the time span implications of a
policy in a historical analysis, and they depend critically on the
FIT life span considered and energy market prices.
It is interesting to note that the interest repayments incurred by
the decision to run a tariff deficit confers non-negligible impacts.
The impacts of opportunity costs increased by an order of magni-
tude from 2000–2010, but most still occur in the future, spread
over the time horizon of 15 years in which the tariff deficit is being
recovered. Instead, if the Portuguese government had made the
decision to pay the FITs upfront, the total impacts described above
(i.e., also including impacts occurring after 2010) reduce to
69 MtCO2eq mitigated, reduction of 10.5 thousand M€, and reduc-
tion of 38 ky.
The calculations described in the preceding paragraph were
performed by removing the opportunity costs associated with
interest payments and considering that remainder opportunity
costs are passed fully to electricity consumers in the same year
in which the FIT is paid to electricity producers. This observation
highlights the importance of opportunity costs to the total impact
of a renewable energy policy, not only in terms of the size of the FIT
subsidy, but also whether its cost is passed on to current or future
generations. These results are of interest to international policy
makers when designing such policies.
Other factors that may impact these estimates will be future
changes in carbon price, and other policies for the control of GHG
emissions. Any policy implementation moving to increase the cost
of GHG emission will only soften opportunity impacts into the
future. Finally, notice that there are ancillary benefits such as the
pricing of risk due to increased energy security, the increase in air
quality, and the reduction of pollution costs, which are not being
taken into account here, again highlighting the fact that this is a
maximum cost estimate of the FIT policy during this time period.
It is also important to acknowledge that the uncertainty of our
results differ across modes of propagation, with impacts resulting
from operational and capital costs being more accurate than
opportunity costs. The latter have a distributional aspect which
was not covered in this study, but which undoubtedly merits more
attention in the future. In order to capture at least some of the
uncertainty, we performed a sensitivity analysis to examine how
the results were affected by the expenditure profile of consumers.
Thus, for every year under analysis, we considered the same total
expenditure by taxpayers and consumers of electricity to support
the FITs, but besides the observed expenditure profile in that year
we also calculated the impacts of the expenditure profile of every
other year in the period under study. Our results showed that the
sensitivity to the expenditure profile was capped at 0.24 MtCO2eq,
6.4 ky, and 71 M€. Ideally, though, opportunity costs would be cap-
tured with more detail by splitting households into different
income categories and using a different consumption profile for
each income category.
When comparing our results for employment with those in the
literature, a commonly reported job indicator is the job ratio, calcu-
lated here by dividing the Job Years created or destroyed per MW
RES-E installed by the assumed lifetime of the system, in this case
25 years [9]. We find a job ratio over the 2000–2010 period of 1.15
jobs/MW. This estimate is of a similar order of magnitude as found
318 P. Behrens et al. / Applied Energy 173 (2016) 309–319in other studies: for example Blanco and Rodrigues [71] found job
ratios of wind in Spain of 1.35 jobs/MW and Lambert and Silva [9]
report job ratios varying from 0.76 to 6.97 in various EU countries.
In terms of employment generation by RES-E energy provided,
rather than installed capacity, we find a ratio of 0.27 jobs/GW h,
which agrees well with averages between 0.08 and 0.32 for wind
and biomass as reported in a review of European and U.S. studies
by Kammen et al. [72], summarised in Lambert and Silva [9].7. Conclusions
There are few studies of full policy impacts of FITs due to the
difficulty of examining economy wide impacts [13]. Here we pro-
vide, to our knowledge, the first examination of the economy wide
impacts of historical costs and benefits of renewable energy policy.
We split impacts by their mode of propagation through the energy
sector and the rest of the economy: operational, capital, and
opportunity.
Our main results, elaborated in Section 5 indicate that the his-
torical renewable energy policy in Portugal 2000–2010 led to
cumulative net impacts of a GHG reduction of 7.2 MtCO2eq, a cre-
ation of 1557 M€ in GDP, and a creation of 160 ky in JY. In order to
allow for international comparisons, we put these figures into per-
spective by dividing cumulative impacts over the accumulated
emissions, GDP, and employment in the period 2000–2010. We
find that the combined energy policy and RES-E infrastructure over
2000–2010 led to significant GHG emission reductions (1% of
national emissions), while impacts on JY were an order of magni-
tude lower (+0.2%) and the impact on GDP was negligible (less than
0.001%). In the final year of analysis our results show a significant
GHG emission reduction (4% of national emissions), while impacts
on GDP and JY were again orders of magnitude lower (0.3 and
+0.04% of national totals, respectively).
Furthermore, in Section 6 we further extend the discussion and
provide tentative estimates of the consequences of the renewable
energy policy beyond the period 2000–2010. We argue that due
to technological lock-in, and the fact that GHG emissions were
affected mainly by the operational mode of propagation, a signifi-
cant part of GHG savings (90%) are likely to occur in the future (i.e.,
beyond 2011). GDP was mainly affected by opportunity costs,
therefore a large fraction of GDP reduction (89%) would also occur
in the future. Initially, employment was driven by capital forma-
tion but later, as construction of new infrastructure abates, oppor-
tunity costs dominate and net impacts become negative. It should
be mentioned that the even over this extended time horizon, the
relative impact of the renewable energy policy 2000–2010 on
GHG emissions is an order of magnitude greater than the relative
impact on GDP, which in turn is another order of magnitude
greater than the relative impact on employment.
While there are limitations inherent in this approach due to the
time window of investigation, by taking a maximum cost approach
we can provide an upper limit of these policy impacts. Given the
high similarity between the Portuguese FIT settings and several
other European nations [8], these results will be of further interest
when considering other FIT policies internationally.
As the large scale deployment of RES-E technologies matures it
will become possible to replicate this type of backward-looking
study with tighter estimation bounds, as the fraction of spillover
effects beyond the time horizon of the analysis diminishes. By hav-
ing a provided a transparent methodology for the assessment of
the impacts of FITs across various modes of propagation we pro-
vide a template for similar studies in other countries and time
frames. We believe that the knowledge thus gained can better
inform policy makers and guide the design of RES-E incentives
which are both cost-effective and environmentally sound.Acknowledgments
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